Beginning in 1969
The Leak-Tapping Program
The book’s later revelations trace the administration’s covert activity to a domestic surveillance program begun in 1969. Under a claimed national-security rationale, officials pursued leaks and monitored government employees and reporters, extending the reach of secret operations beyond the 1972 campaign.
The program’s history would matter when Watergate investigators uncovered the [White House Plumbers](entity:organization-recall-organization-8b42ffbae5c1) and when missing tap logs became evidence of how far the administration had gone to control information.
1971
The Plumbers Take Shape
The [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) formed a leak-investigation team that included [E. Howard Hunt](entity:character-recall-character-e-howard-hunt-659940e3b281), [G. Gordon Liddy](entity:character-recall-character-g-gordon-liddy-b8fe8f164d17), [David Young](entity:character-recall-character-david-young-31925099cfe6), and [Egil Krogh](entity:character-recall-character-egil-krogh-c4c4be055559). Working from the [Executive Office Building](entity:location-recall-location-e33b033d40eb) and reporting through [John Ehrlichman](entity:character-recall-character-john-ehrlichman-93bac5c9969e)’s orbit, the Plumbers investigated government leaks and gathered intelligence.
What began as an effort to examine the Pentagon Papers widened into inquiries about other leaks and political targets. Its personnel and methods would later connect the White House’s leak investigations to Watergate and other covert operations.
Summer 1971
Hunt Targets Kennedy
Soon after joining the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) as a consultant, [E. Howard Hunt](entity:character-recall-character-e-howard-hunt-659940e3b281) pursued information about Senator [Edward M. Kennedy](entity:character-recall-character-edward-m-kennedy-0e128a6c0003) and the Chappaquiddick accident. He consulted material from the White House library and visited Clifton DeMotte in Massachusetts under an alias, asking about possible damaging stories.
The inquiry later established that Hunt was not simply a neutral consultant researching policy. His work included political investigations aimed at a potential presidential rival, an early indication of the White House’s appetite for opposition intelligence.
June 26–27, 1971
Segretti’s Recruitment Offer
[Donald Segretti](entity:character-recall-character-donald-segretti-943cce992604) approached [Alex Shipley](entity:character-recall-character-alex-shipley-ef7f0f619d8e), an Army lawyer preparing to leave military service, with an offer to conduct undercover work against Democratic candidates. He described infiltrating campaigns, recruiting operatives, disrupting rallies, and using deception to prevent Democrats from regrouping after their primaries.
Shipley declined to join, though he initially entertained the possibility of learning more. His account later gave the reporters an unusually detailed lead into a nationwide dirty-tricks operation and the political network behind it.
February 24–26, 1972
The Canuck Letter
During the New Hampshire primary, the Manchester Union Leader published a purported letter accusing Edmund Muskie’s campaign of insulting Franco-Americans. The letter was fabricated, but its publication and the accompanying attack on Muskie’s wife helped provoke a public breakdown that damaged his carefully cultivated image.
Later reporting connected the letter to the Nixon [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) and to [Kenneth Clawson](entity:character-recall-character-kenneth-clawson-3aba4a36bc16). The incident became a vivid example of how political sabotage could exploit a candidate’s vulnerabilities while disguising its source.
June 17, 1972
The Watergate Break-In
Before dawn, five men were arrested inside [Democratic National Committee headquarters](entity:location-recall-location-democratic-national-170f0d0debc4) at the [Watergate complex](entity:location-recall-location-watergate-complex-cf76404ddf4b). They carried cameras, film, lock picks, listening devices, and substantial amounts of cash; they wore business suits and surgical gloves, making the burglary look unusually organized.
The arrests began as a local police story, but the equipment and the burglars’ backgrounds raised questions about surveillance and political purpose. For [Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97) and [Carl Bernstein](entity:character-recall-character-carl-bernstein-1b1944d77f5a), the break-in became the first visible edge of a much larger investigation.
June 17, 1972
McCord Names the CIA
At a preliminary hearing, [James McCord](entity:character-recall-character-james-mccord-68762e701ffa) described himself as a security consultant and said he had recently retired from government service. When the judge asked where, McCord quietly answered, “CIA,” startling [Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97).
That disclosure strengthened the sense that the arrests did not involve ordinary burglars. It also gave the Washington Post a detail compelling enough to move the story onto its Sunday front page, even though the break-in’s sponsors and purpose remained unknown.
June 18, 1972
The Campaign Connection
The next morning, wire reports identified [James McCord](entity:character-recall-character-james-mccord-68762e701ffa) as the security coordinator for the [Committee for the Re-election of the President](entity:organization-recall-organization-committee-for-th-4292d056f1a2). [John Mitchell](entity:character-recall-character-john-mitchell-403c00b69317), the campaign manager, insisted that McCord and the other men had acted without the committee’s knowledge or consent.
The Democratic chairman rejected the denial as insufficient, while the Post reporters began checking McCord’s employment and background. The first direct link between a Watergate burglar and Nixon’s campaign turned the break-in into a question of institutional responsibility.
June 19–20, 1972
Hunt Appears in the Address Books
The burglars’ address books contained [E. Howard Hunt](entity:character-recall-character-e-howard-hunt-659940e3b281)’s name and telephone number, and police inventory records connected the men to a country-club bill bearing Hunt’s name. [Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97) reached Hunt at his public-relations firm; Hunt reacted sharply and refused to discuss the matter.
[White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) staff then volunteered denials of involvement, while confirming that Hunt had worked for [Charles Colson](entity:character-recall-character-charles-colson-c3759ba7ac88). The abrupt defensiveness made the connection more consequential: a former CIA officer with White House access was now tied to the arrested burglars.
June 19–22, 1972
The First Network of Leads
[Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97) and [Carl Bernstein](entity:character-recall-character-carl-bernstein-1b1944d77f5a) traced [James McCord](entity:character-recall-character-james-mccord-68762e701ffa)’s employment, military reserve duties, and political connections. A reserve unit connected to McCord reportedly planned for censorship and lists of radicals, while another lead connected a [Miami](entity:location-recall-location-miami-28b8b009fa19) burglar to requests for convention accommodations.
The reporters also learned of suspicious travel, possible earlier burglaries, and efforts involving Democratic convention facilities. Each clue was incomplete, but together they undermined the notion that the Watergate operation was an isolated burglary by politically unconnected men.
June 22–July 1, 1972
Mitchell’s First Denials
President [Richard Nixon](entity:character-recall-character-richard-nixon-fd54ecbe169c) declared that the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) had no involvement in “this particular incident.” [John Mitchell](entity:character-recall-character-john-mitchell-403c00b69317) soon resigned as campaign manager, explaining that his wife wanted him to leave. At first, many Post reporters treated the resignation as unrelated to Watergate.
[Harry Rosenfeld](entity:character-recall-character-harry-rosenfeld-ffab21dc1e5f) challenged that assumption: a politician with Mitchell’s power would not abandon the campaign merely at his wife’s request. The resignation became a turning point in the reporters’ understanding that the denials might conceal more than the burglary itself.
Summer 1972
Hunt’s Kennedy Inquiry Emerges
[Carl Bernstein](entity:character-recall-character-carl-bernstein-1b1944d77f5a) and [Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97) followed reports that Hunt had researched Senator Edward Kennedy while employed as a [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) consultant. A former White House secretary recalled Kennedy materials on Hunt’s desk, and a librarian initially remembered Hunt borrowing books about Chappaquiddick.
The White House disputed the account, and the editors published only a carefully qualified version. Further reporting from a White House aide and the [Library of Congress](entity:location-recall-location-library-of-congress-10e24e5c082c) supported the conclusion that Hunt had been assigned political research, exposing how easily the administration’s description of his duties could mislead.
Late June–July 1972
Hunt Vanishes and Returns
After speaking briefly with [Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97), [E. Howard Hunt](entity:character-recall-character-e-howard-hunt-659940e3b281) disappeared. The FBI assigned agents to find him, while the reporters struggled to establish how far his connection to Watergate extended.
Hunt reappeared in July, the same day the Post published its qualified story about his Kennedy research. The episode deepened the sense that the investigation was being managed behind closed doors and that the people closest to the operation were under pressure to remain silent.
July 1972
The Security Fund Lead
A source told [Carl Bernstein](entity:character-recall-character-carl-bernstein-1b1944d77f5a) that Hunt’s attorney had received $25,000 in cash and that the Nixon campaign had at least $100,000 set aside for convention security. The source emphasized that the money, not merely the burglars’ identities, was the key to the case.
Bernstein and Woodward could not initially verify the claim. Their difficulty finding witnesses willing to speak, along with official leaks pointing toward an anti-Castro explanation, made the investigation appear to stall just as its financial trail began to open.
July 25–31, 1972
The Mexico City Money Trail

A New York Times report said that telephone calls from [Bernard Barker](entity:character-recall-character-bernard-barker-fd848f8b71c0)’s [Miami](entity:location-recall-location-miami-28b8b009fa19) phones had reached the Nixon campaign. [Carl Bernstein](entity:character-recall-character-carl-bernstein-1b1944d77f5a) followed a separate lead through [Martin Dardis](entity:character-recall-character-martin-dardis-679ae9b20be2), an investigator for the Dade County state’s attorney, who revealed that more than $89,000 had passed through Barker’s bank account from [Mexico City](entity:location-recall-location-mexico-city-78f19f654410).
[The New York Times](entity:organization-recall-organization-a02dba54de1f) published the Mexican connection before Bernstein could meet Dardis. During a hurried visit to Miami, Bernstein examined the records himself and found an additional $25,000 cashier’s check bearing [Kenneth Dahlberg](entity:character-recall-character-kenneth-dahlberg-bb290a6f012a)’s name. The check tied money from a Nixon campaign fund-raiser directly to a Watergate burglar’s account.
August 1, 1972
The Dahlberg Check
[Kenneth Dahlberg](entity:character-recall-character-kenneth-dahlberg-bb290a6f012a) told [Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97) that the $25,000 check represented contributions he had collected for Nixon’s campaign. He recalled handing it to either the campaign treasurer [Hugh Sloan](entity:character-recall-character-hugh-sloan-90ca7dc9f879) or finance chairman [Maurice Stans](entity:character-recall-character-maurice-stans-d1b94eb322f0), later concluding that he had given it directly to Stans.
The Post reported that a campaign contribution had entered Barker’s bank account. The discovery revealed that campaign finance and Watergate were connected by an actual paper trail, and it prompted the [General Accounting Office](entity:organization-recall-organization-eba1beeb75f9) to begin a broader audit of Nixon campaign funds.
August 1972
Sloan Leaves the Campaign
[Hugh Sloan](entity:character-recall-character-hugh-sloan-90ca7dc9f879), the CRP treasurer, resigned soon after the Dahlberg story and the emerging questions about campaign cash. The committee described his departure as personal, but investigators and reporters began to suspect that his discomfort was connected to secret disbursements.
Sloan’s departure mattered because he had handled money and might know how it moved. He was young, cautious, and deeply invested in the administration’s ideals, qualities that would later make his account of the secret fund especially significant.
August 1972
The Hidden Cash Fund
The GAO’s preliminary findings described hundreds of thousands of dollars in mishandled campaign money and a cash fund that had not been properly reported. The committee had previously denied that such a fund existed, but its spokesman [Devan Shumway](entity:character-recall-character-devan-shumway-c571eb804f98) now admitted that people inside CRP had not told him the truth.
The fund’s existence changed the central question from whether the burglars had ties to the campaign to who had controlled the money and what it had financed. A delayed GAO report and the intervention of [Maurice Stans](entity:character-recall-character-maurice-stans-d1b94eb322f0) heightened suspicion that powerful figures were trying to limit what became public.
August 22, 1972
Richey Seals the Testimony
Judge [Charles R. Richey](entity:character-recall-character-charles-r-richey-4ebd8bd9b6a0) reversed his earlier decision and sealed pretrial testimony in the Democrats’ civil suit against the Nixon campaign. His ruling kept sworn statements from [John Mitchell](entity:character-recall-character-john-mitchell-403c00b69317), [Maurice Stans](entity:character-recall-character-maurice-stans-d1b94eb322f0), and others from public view before the election.
Richey then unexpectedly telephoned Bernstein to explain that political considerations had played no part. The call itself raised the possibility that someone might have suspected improper influence, while the ruling deprived the public of potentially important evidence at a politically sensitive moment.
August 24–26, 1972
The Mexican Laundry
[Martin Dardis](entity:character-recall-character-martin-dardis-679ae9b20be2) told Bernstein that [Richard Haynes](entity:character-recall-character-richard-haynes-051c99c32f77), a lawyer for [Texas](entity:location-recall-location-texas-f19b16f8e87c) campaign chairman Robert Allen, had described a scheme for routing political contributions through Mexico. [Manuel Ogarrio Daguerre](entity:character-recall-character-manuel-ogarrio-dagu-a9628731fc3a) converted checks and securities into money that could be sent onward without an easily subpoenaed American record.
Haynes estimated that roughly $750,000 had passed through the arrangement. The scheme could conceal anonymous gifts, corporate contributions, and other donations prohibited or restricted by campaign law. A final GAO report identified apparent violations and a substantial cash fund, giving the reporters independent support for the broader money trail.
August 29, 1972
Nixon Defends the Campaign
At a press conference in [San Clemente](entity:location-recall-location-286a82fc3c67), [Richard Nixon](entity:character-recall-character-richard-nixon-fd54ecbe169c) described campaign-finance violations as technical and said apparent violations existed on both sides. He praised [Maurice Stans](entity:character-recall-character-maurice-stans-d1b94eb322f0) as honest and meticulous, rejected calls for an independent prosecutor, and said [John Dean](entity:character-recall-character-john-dean-a9754afe5f17)’s investigation had found no current administration official involved in Watergate.
The careful phrase [“presently employed”](entity:expression-recall-expression-presently-employed-69c7d4339c1f) left room around departed figures such as Hunt, Liddy, Mitchell, and Stans. Nixon’s assurance that the true injury would come from a cover-up rather than the original wrongdoing would soon become a standard against which his own conduct was judged.
Mid-August–September 1972
Fear at Campaign Headquarters
[Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97) and [Carl Bernstein](entity:character-recall-character-carl-bernstein-1b1944d77f5a) began visiting CRP employees at home after the committee’s telephone roster and official channels yielded little. Some workers trembled, cried, or warned the reporters not to return; others described records disappearing and FBI interviews conducted in the presence of committee lawyers or [Robert Mardian](entity:character-recall-character-robert-mardian-a32310fca388).
The accounts suggested a climate of intimidation and a deliberate effort to keep employees from volunteering information. The reporters learned that [Sally Harmony](entity:character-recall-character-sally-harmony-f112982a3098) and others might have withheld facts, while the growing fear among ordinary campaign workers convinced them the stakes reached beyond a botched burglary.
September 14, 1972
The Bookkeeper Speaks
A CRP accountant known to the reporters only as the Bookkeeper described a secret cash account and named [Jeb Magruder](entity:character-recall-character-jeb-magruder-68799ce17401), Bart Porter, and Liddy as recipients of large payments. She said that Mitchell’s aides, including [Fred LaRue](entity:character-recall-character-fred-larue-4c3f207d71cf), knew more than they had admitted and that relevant records had been destroyed.
Her account was initially fragmentary: she distinguished between people who received money and those who authorized or knew about its distribution. She pointed the reporters toward the political leadership of the campaign and gave them a way to test their suspicions against the fund’s records and other witnesses.
September 15, 1972
The Watergate Seven Indicted
A grand jury indicted [E. Howard Hunt](entity:character-recall-character-e-howard-hunt-659940e3b281), [G. Gordon Liddy](entity:character-recall-character-g-gordon-liddy-b8fe8f164d17), and the five men arrested in the Watergate offices. The charges covered conspiracy, burglary, and illegal interception of communications, but did not answer who sponsored the operation or what it was meant to accomplish.
The limited indictment sharpened the reporters’ distrust of the federal investigation. Officials insisted they had the facts and were unlikely to reopen the inquiry, even though the secret fund, Mexican checks, and possible involvement of senior campaign figures remained unresolved.
Summer–September 1972
The Deep Throat Arrangement
[Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97) maintained a confidential relationship with a senior source in the Executive Branch whom he called only “my friend.” Their conversations were on [deep background](entity:expression-recall-expression-deep-background-a78612c6a4cc): the source would not be quoted or used as the sole basis for a story, but could confirm material found elsewhere and offer perspective.
As the source grew more nervous, Woodward devised signals for meetings in an underground garage. The arrangement became a lifeline during the investigation, but it also required Woodward to separate useful confirmation from the temptation to let an anonymous official write the story for him.
September 17–18, 1972
The Secret Fund Is Tied to Espionage
After speaking again with the Bookkeeper, Woodward and Bernstein reported that a secret CRP fund financed intelligence-gathering against Democrats and that Liddy and senior campaign officials had received money. [Deep Throat](entity:character-recall-character-deep-throat-ef6f99bc6aea) strengthened the story, confirming that the fund paid for Watergate-related espionage and that wiretap logs had reached some of the officials who controlled it.
The reporters did not claim more than their sources could support; they described a broad intelligence operation while distinguishing what was established from what remained uncertain. The story challenged the assumption that the indictments had dismantled the conspiracy and pointed toward more answers inside the campaign committee.
September 17–18, 1972
Magruder Denies the Payments
When Woodward offered [Jeb Magruder](entity:character-recall-character-jeb-magruder-68799ce17401) a chance to respond before publication, Magruder flatly denied receiving money from a secret fund. He added that investigators had questioned him about the allegation but had discarded it, then pleaded that he not be quoted because he would get in trouble.
The denial did not resolve the discrepancy; its strained tone made the reporters more cautious, not less. Woodward and Bernstein chose qualified language for the story and adhered to an emerging rule that serious criminal allegations required more than one source.
Late September 1972
Sloan Describes Mitchell’s Control
[Hugh Sloan](entity:character-recall-character-hugh-sloan-90ca7dc9f879) told [Carl Bernstein](entity:character-recall-character-carl-bernstein-1b1944d77f5a) that the secret fund’s disbursements had been authorized by senior figures. Mitchell had personally approved payments while Attorney General, and later authority was shared with [Maurice Stans](entity:character-recall-character-maurice-stans-d1b94eb322f0) and [Jeb Magruder](entity:character-recall-character-jeb-magruder-68799ce17401); the fund also connected the political operation to the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) hierarchy.
Sloan’s account exposed how campaign cash had been distributed without ordinary receipts or accounting. The Post’s editors demanded certainty before naming Mitchell, aware that accusing a former Attorney General could bring severe legal and political consequences.
Late September 1972
The Mitchell Fund Story
[Ben Bradlee](entity:character-recall-character-ben-bradlee-3f256db1e18c) pressed the reporters to decide whether their sourcing was strong enough to report that [John Mitchell](entity:character-recall-character-john-mitchell-403c00b69317) had controlled the secret Republican fund while Attorney General. After questioning them closely, he approved the story, which described Mitchell’s authority and the fund’s use for political intelligence.
Mitchell’s public response was a furious late-night call to Bernstein. He denied the charges in evasive language, threatened a retaliatory story about the Post, and warned publisher [Katharine Graham](entity:character-recall-character-katharine-graham-2b1af6cda573) would regret publication. Bradlee allowed most of the call into print, turning the campaign’s response into part of the story.
October 4, 1972
Baldwin’s Account Breaks
The [Los Angeles Times](entity:organization-recall-organization-48be8b6aa6fb) published [Alfred C. Baldwin III](entity:character-recall-character-alfred-c-baldwin-ii-de3e1e6d69b2)’s account of monitoring Democratic telephone conversations from across the [Watergate complex](entity:location-recall-location-watergate-complex-cf76404ddf4b). Baldwin described [E. Howard Hunt](entity:character-recall-character-e-howard-hunt-659940e3b281)’s panic after the arrests, an aborted effort against McGovern headquarters, and his own role in the operation.
The story made the surveillance concrete and showed that the Watergate burglary belonged to a wider apparatus. The Post had been trying to reach Baldwin but refused to pay for his account, in keeping with its policy against buying news.
October 6, 1972
The False Memo-Recipient Story
[Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97) and [Carl Bernstein](entity:character-recall-character-carl-bernstein-1b1944d77f5a) reported that Baldwin had identified [Robert Odle](entity:character-recall-character-robert-odle-b2b835a5b890), William Timmons, and J. Glenn Sedam as recipients of wiretap memoranda. Their information came from a source familiar with an initial FBI report, but the report did not clearly distinguish wiretap records from routine security memoranda.
The allegation was wrong. Robert Odle and Timmons suffered reputational harm, and the error forced the reporters to confront how quickly ambiguous investigative material could become a damaging front-page accusation. Their later caution was shaped by this failure.
September 28–October 7, 1972
Segretti’s Operation Confirmed
[Alex Shipley](entity:character-recall-character-alex-shipley-ef7f0f619d8e) gave Bernstein a detailed account of [Donald Segretti](entity:character-recall-character-donald-segretti-943cce992604)’s attempts to recruit former Army colleagues for political espionage and sabotage. Further calls confirmed that Segretti had approached other lawyers, while credit-card records showed extensive travel through states where Democratic primaries were contested.
The Justice Department confirmed that Segretti had entered the Watergate investigation through telephone records tied to Hunt. A source also connected the activity to [Dwight Chapin](entity:character-recall-character-dwight-chapin-0d5b4b38e504), drawing the reporters toward the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) appointments secretary and the USC circle around the Nixon campaign.
Early October 1972
The USC Mafia Connection
Reporting on [Donald Segretti](entity:character-recall-character-donald-segretti-943cce992604) led the Post to former [University of Southern California](entity:organization-recall-organization-5e4e65b7db88) classmates of [Dwight Chapin](entity:character-recall-character-dwight-chapin-0d5b4b38e504) and [Kenneth Clawson](entity:character-recall-character-kenneth-clawson-3aba4a36bc16). The group’s college political culture had included ballot-box tricks, planted spies, and fraudulent campaign material; insiders called the tactics “ratfucking.”
The connections suggested that sabotage was not an improvisation by an isolated operative. It had roots in an organized political network whose members later held positions in the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) and Nixon’s campaign.
Early October 1972
Deep Throat’s Wider Briefing
In a late-night garage meeting, [Deep Throat](entity:character-recall-character-deep-throat-ef6f99bc6aea) urged Woodward to look beyond the [Watergate break-in](entity:event-recall-event-watergate-break-in-eda65367212c). He described intelligence operations against Democratic contributors and candidates, said that the activities were linked rather than freelance, and confirmed that senior officials were involved.
After Woodward pressed for specifics, Deep Throat said that more than fifty people had worked for the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) and the campaign on spying, sabotage, forged letters, surveillance, and disruption. The account transformed Watergate from a single criminal episode into part of a national political strategy.
October 10, 1972
The National Sabotage Exposé
[The Washington Post](entity:organization-recall-organization-the-washington-p-ce3f391d313c) published a sweeping account asserting that federal investigators had found a campaign of spying and sabotage directed by officials of the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) and CRP. It listed tactics including forged letters, false press leaks, disruption of campaign schedules, surveillance, and infiltration of protest groups.
The story combined hard evidence about [Donald Segretti](entity:character-recall-character-donald-segretti-943cce992604) and the [Canuck Letter](entity:object-recall-object-canuck-letter-6b5a1f0893a5) with a broader interpretation of scattered investigative findings. Its bold lead was risky, but it forced the country to consider the possibility that the Watergate burglary was one operation within a much larger campaign.
October 12, 1972
Muskie’s Sabotage Evidence
Edmund Muskie told Bernstein that his campaign had suffered repeated leaks, disruptions, and fabrications, though he could not prove who was responsible. His staff described fake campaign literature, missing polling data, hoax telephone calls, and interference with campaign events.
The Post documented specific incidents while carefully noting the lack of direct proof tying each one to the Nixon organization. Muskie’s account gave the sabotage story human and political consequence, even as the candidate acknowledged that his own campaign’s weaknesses had also contributed to its decline.
October 9–10, 1972
Clawson and the Canuck Letter
[Marilyn Berger](entity:character-recall-character-marilyn-berger-610b5d16944b) told the Post that [Kenneth Clawson](entity:character-recall-character-kenneth-clawson-3aba4a36bc16) had said he wrote the [Canuck Letter](entity:object-recall-object-canuck-letter-6b5a1f0893a5) to damage Muskie, whom the Nixon operation viewed as a strong opponent. Clawson later denied the admission, but his reaction to Berger’s account focused as much on the fact that they had spoken privately in her apartment as on the substance of the allegation.
The Post published Berger’s account alongside Clawson’s denial. The episode brought a [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) communications aide into the dirty-tricks story and showed how a fabricated letter could move from campaign tactic to evidence of an operation reaching inside the administration.
October 15, 1972
Chapin Named as a Contact
[Larry Young](entity:character-recall-character-larry-young-e93c7b6cf2ba) gave the Post a sworn account of [Donald Segretti](entity:character-recall-character-donald-segretti-943cce992604)’s relationship with [Dwight Chapin](entity:character-recall-character-dwight-chapin-0d5b4b38e504) and a West Coast lawyer who appeared to fit [Herbert Kalmbach](entity:character-recall-character-herbert-kalmbach-c52abdebcad1). Young said Segretti described political sabotage as part of the President’s reelection drive and sought Chapin’s help when FBI scrutiny intensified.
The resulting story named Chapin as a contact in a spying and sabotage operation. The [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) called it hearsay and inaccurate, but the report moved Watergate closer to the President’s inner circle and strengthened the case that Segretti had not acted alone.
October 16, 1972
Kalmbach Linked to the Fund
Further reporting established that [Herbert Kalmbach](entity:character-recall-character-herbert-kalmbach-c52abdebcad1) had paid [Donald Segretti](entity:character-recall-character-donald-segretti-943cce992604) from a lawyer’s trust account. [Hugh Sloan](entity:character-recall-character-hugh-sloan-90ca7dc9f879) told Woodward that Kalmbach had been one of the people with authority over the campaign’s covert fund and that the money in California and Washington belonged to the same pool.
Kalmbach’s role connected the campaign’s private legal and fundraising machinery to the sabotage effort. The Post reported the link, while the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) offered no immediate comment, leaving the growing evidence difficult to dismiss as merely an anonymous accusation.
October 16, 1972
The White House Counterattack
[Ronald Ziegler](entity:character-recall-character-ronald-ziegler-5a6a4faeef93) denounced the Post’s reports as hearsay, innuendo, and guilt by association. Republican chairman [Robert Dole](entity:character-recall-character-robert-dole-465aac652980) and campaign director [Clark MacGregor](entity:character-recall-character-clark-macgregor-4f2e1640b8af) attacked the newspaper and [George McGovern](entity:character-recall-character-george-mcgovern-4f0f230832a1), charging that the reporting was politically motivated and unfair.
Rather than answer the underlying allegations, the administration made the conduct and motives of the press the issue. The coordinated counterattack showed that the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) understood the political danger of the stories, even as its spokesmen avoided direct, detailed denials.
October 18, 1972
Telephone Records Confirm Contact
[The New York Times](entity:organization-recall-organization-a02dba54de1f) published telephone records showing repeated calls between [Donald Segretti](entity:character-recall-character-donald-segretti-943cce992604)’s telephone or credit card and the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd), [Dwight Chapin](entity:character-recall-character-dwight-chapin-0d5b4b38e504), and [E. Howard Hunt](entity:character-recall-character-e-howard-hunt-659940e3b281). The documentation made the administration’s claim that the Post relied only on innuendo harder to sustain.
At a White House briefing, Ziegler continued to deny that current staff had been involved, carefully emphasizing the word “directed” rather than answering whether people had participated or known. The distinction became a recurring feature of the administration’s denials.
October 23–24, 1972
The Haldeman Story
[Hugh Sloan](entity:character-recall-character-hugh-sloan-90ca7dc9f879) confirmed that five people had authority over the secret fund and allowed the reporters to identify the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) figure as [H. R. Haldeman](entity:character-recall-character-h-r-haldeman-7312416c36e3). An FBI agent separately confirmed that Haldeman’s name had appeared in the investigation, and [Deep Throat](entity:character-recall-character-deep-throat-ef6f99bc6aea) warned Woodward not to proceed only if the story was wrong.
The Post published the allegation that Haldeman controlled the fund, attributing the claim partly to Sloan’s grand-jury testimony. The article raised the stakes dramatically, since Haldeman was the President’s closest aide, but the attribution to testimony would soon prove mistaken.
October 25, 1972
The Attribution Collapses
[Hugh Sloan](entity:character-recall-character-hugh-sloan-90ca7dc9f879)’s lawyer publicly denied that Sloan had named Haldeman before the grand jury. The denial was correct: Sloan had not been asked the relevant question in that proceeding, though he had confirmed Haldeman’s role to the reporters in a separate conversation.
Woodward and Bernstein panicked, realizing that they had collapsed separate conversations into a false attribution. The [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) seized on the error to condemn the Post, while the reporters retraced their steps and recognized that eagerness to confirm their theory had weakened their verification.
October 26, 1972
MacGregor Confirms the Cash Fund
[Clark MacGregor](entity:character-recall-character-clark-macgregor-4f2e1640b8af) acknowledged that CRP maintained a cash fund for clandestine activities, though he insisted that its money had not knowingly been used illegally. He named Mitchell, Stans, Magruder, Porter, and Liddy as people who had authorized or received payments.
The admission contradicted the administration’s previous denials that such a fund existed. It partly restored the reporters’ credibility after the Haldeman attribution error and confirmed that the campaign’s secret cash system was real.
Late October 1972
The Haldeman Correction
Sloan clarified that he had confirmed Haldeman’s authority over the fund to the reporters but had never named him to the grand jury. [Deep Throat](entity:character-recall-character-deep-throat-ef6f99bc6aea) also reaffirmed that the essential fact was correct, while criticizing the reporters for moving too quickly and relying on ambiguous confirmations.
The Post published a clarification that acknowledged the error in its account of Sloan’s testimony while maintaining that federal sources confirmed Haldeman’s control. The episode became a lasting lesson in the dangers of coded confirmation, assumptions, and the pressure to publish a major story before its evidentiary foundation was secure.
November 7, 1972
Nixon Wins Re-Election
[Richard Nixon](entity:character-recall-character-richard-nixon-fd54ecbe169c) won a landslide victory over [George McGovern](entity:character-recall-character-george-mcgovern-4f0f230832a1), while the Watergate stories had limited apparent effect on the electorate. [Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97) did not vote; [Carl Bernstein](entity:character-recall-character-carl-bernstein-1b1944d77f5a) voted for McGovern but had expected Nixon to win.
After the election, the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) could no longer plausibly portray the Post as acting to elect McGovern. The reporters hoped that campaign workers might speak more freely once the political contest was over, but the story entered a quieter and frustrating phase.
Late November–December 1972
The Grand-Jury Approach
Seeking information the investigation appeared to have missed, [Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97) and [Carl Bernstein](entity:character-recall-character-carl-bernstein-1b1944d77f5a) obtained Watergate grand-jury names and approached several jurors. They told themselves that the jurors could choose whether to speak, but the effort risked violating the secrecy surrounding the proceedings.
At least one juror reported the visits. Judge [John Sirica](entity:character-recall-character-john-sirica-79ddf2c5189b) reprimanded the reporters and emphasized the sacred secrecy of the grand jury, but took no immediate punitive action because no information had been disclosed. The episode left the reporters uneasy about how far their pursuit of the story had carried them.
Late 1972
Sloan Explains Haldeman’s Insulation
[Hugh Sloan](entity:character-recall-character-hugh-sloan-90ca7dc9f879) explained that Haldeman stood behind the people who received large payments from the fund, although he had not personally ordered Sloan to hand out cash. Magruder, Kalmbach, Stans, and Mitchell served as intermediaries, insulating the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) chief of staff from direct involvement.
Sloan also clarified the reporters’ earlier misunderstanding: he had thought they were asking whether he would have named Haldeman if asked, not whether he had actually named him before the grand jury. His fuller account restored the distinction between Haldeman’s role in the fund and the evidence available to prove it.
December 1972
The Plumbers’ Secret Phone

[Carl Bernstein](entity:character-recall-character-carl-bernstein-1b1944d77f5a) found a confidential record showing that a telephone had been installed in the [Executive Office Building](entity:location-recall-location-e33b033d40eb) under a former [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) secretary’s name. [Kathleen Chenow](entity:character-recall-character-kathleen-chenow-c698f85589b2) said it was [E. Howard Hunt](entity:character-recall-character-e-howard-hunt-659940e3b281)’s line, used chiefly for calls from [Bernard Barker](entity:character-recall-character-bernard-barker-fd848f8b71c0), and that its unusual billing arrangement had been set up through Ehrlichman’s office.
Chenow also described the Plumbers’ leak investigations and the White House’s involvement in preparing her for FBI questioning. The story established on-the-record that the Plumbers existed and that Hunt had used a concealed communications channel inside the executive complex.
February 1973
CRP Subpoenas the Post
CRP subpoenaed [Bob Woodward](entity:character-recall-character-bob-woodward-7acfb88a4d97), [Carl Bernstein](entity:character-recall-character-carl-bernstein-1b1944d77f5a), other Post journalists, and publisher [Katharine Graham](entity:character-recall-character-katharine-graham-2b1af6cda573) in the Democrats’ civil suit. The subpoenas demanded reporters’ notes, tapes, and drafts about Watergate.
The newspaper prepared to fight the demand and protect confidential sources. Bradlee warned that the subpoenas were only the first stage of a broader campaign to pressure the Post, while Graham signaled that she would accept personal consequences rather than surrender the paper’s reporting materials.
January–February 1973
Ervin Launches a Senate Inquiry
Senator [Sam Ervin](entity:character-recall-character-sam-ervin-7db274acc8bb) agreed to lead a broad Senate investigation of Watergate and the presidential campaign. He sought authority to subpoena witnesses and records from the executive branch, the campaign, and elsewhere, rejecting the idea that the inquiry should be limited to the burglars.
The Senate approved the investigative resolution unanimously after Republicans unsuccessfully tried to broaden its scope to earlier campaigns. The vote established an independent public forum with authority to challenge executive privilege and examine the larger political operation.
February 28, 1973
The Gray Hearings Begin
[L. Patrick Gray](entity:character-recall-character-l-patrick-gray-df1f9614b9fc)’s confirmation hearings became an examination of the FBI’s Watergate investigation. Gray startled the senators by revealing that he had turned investigative files over to [John Dean](entity:character-recall-character-john-dean-a9754afe5f17) and could not guarantee that Dean had not shown them to [Donald Segretti](entity:character-recall-character-donald-segretti-943cce992604).
The disclosure raised questions about the independence of the investigation and the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd)’s access to FBI material. The hearings expanded from a review of Gray’s qualifications into a public inquiry about the administration’s handling of Watergate.
After June 17, 1972; exposed March 1973
The Hunt Notebooks Disappear
[John Dean](entity:character-recall-character-john-dean-a9754afe5f17) had possession of materials taken from Hunt’s [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) safe but did not promptly deliver everything to the FBI. Two notebooks were missing from the inventory; Hunt’s lawyer later said they contained names and addresses that could have led investigators to other people involved.
The White House denied seeing the notebooks, while Dean later acknowledged destroying them. Their disappearance intensified suspicion that evidence had been concealed and that the official investigation had not received the full contents of Hunt’s files.
March 23, 1973
McCord’s Letter Breaks Silence
[James McCord](entity:character-recall-character-james-mccord-68762e701ffa) wrote to Judge Sirica that defendants had faced pressure to plead guilty and remain silent, and that perjury had occurred at trial. He said family members feared for his life if he disclosed what he knew and expressed distrust of the FBI and Justice Department.
The letter suggested that the seven defendants were not the whole story and that people outside the courtroom had sought to suppress testimony. It gave the reporters and the Senate committee a chance to reopen questions that the narrow criminal case had left unanswered.
March 25–26, 1973
McCord Names Dean and Magruder
[Samuel Dash](entity:character-recall-character-samuel-dash-ea22dfdb11fb) announced that McCord had begun supplying a fuller account to the Senate committee. Reports soon said that McCord had implicated [Jeb Magruder](entity:character-recall-character-jeb-magruder-68799ce17401) and [John Dean](entity:character-recall-character-john-dean-a9754afe5f17) in advance knowledge and planning, though some of McCord’s information was secondhand.
The [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) categorically defended Dean but did not similarly protect Magruder. The contrast suggested that loyalties were breaking and that officials who had once operated as a disciplined team were beginning to protect themselves at one another’s expense.
March 21, 1973
Dean Warns Nixon
In a meeting later described by Dean’s associates, [John Dean](entity:character-recall-character-john-dean-a9754afe5f17) told Nixon that a “cancer” was consuming the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) and that senior officials would have to tell prosecutors what they knew. Dean reportedly explained that Haldeman and Ehrlichman had been informed of the cover-up and that he himself had acted under their direction.
Nixon sent Dean to [Camp David](entity:location-recall-location-17168bf96ec6) to organize his thoughts, but the agreement Dean expected did not hold. The President instead became increasingly willing to sacrifice Dean while protecting other senior aides, setting the stage for the administration’s open internal conflict.
March 28, 1973
The Senate Hearings Open
[James McCord](entity:character-recall-character-james-mccord-68762e701ffa) gave closed testimony to the [Senate Watergate Committee](entity:organization-recall-organization-7fc86bf53db9), alleging that [G. Gordon Liddy](entity:character-recall-character-g-gordon-liddy-b8fe8f164d17) had said the operation’s plans and budget were approved by Mitchell and that Colson knew about Watergate in advance. Senators and staff described McCord as persuasive, while acknowledging that some claims were hearsay.
The testimony intensified public pressure and prompted Nixon to say that aides would testify before the grand jury if called. The Senate investigation was now competing with the executive branch’s controlled account of events.
April 8–14, 1973
The Payoff Trail Emerges
[Seymour Hersh](entity:character-recall-character-seymour-hersh-43d1b1578bf5) reported McCord’s testimony that cash had gone from the Nixon campaign committee to the Watergate conspirators. [Hugh Sloan](entity:character-recall-character-hugh-sloan-90ca7dc9f879) told Woodward that [Fred LaRue](entity:character-recall-character-fred-larue-4c3f207d71cf) had received money from the secret fund after the arrests, and the prosecutors were examining whether campaign cash had financed payments to the defendants.
The post-break-in transfer suggested that the fund had become part of a cover-up, not merely a source for pre-election espionage. It connected the original burglary to later efforts to secure the conspirators’ silence.
April 14, 1973
Magruder Cooperates
[Jeb Magruder](entity:character-recall-character-jeb-magruder-68799ce17401) went to federal prosecutors and described the planning of the Watergate operation and the later payoff scheme. Sources told Woodward that Magruder implicated [John Mitchell](entity:character-recall-character-john-mitchell-403c00b69317) and [John Dean](entity:character-recall-character-john-dean-a9754afe5f17), including a meeting in Mitchell’s office where the operation had been discussed with Liddy.
The account was more consequential than McCord’s earlier secondhand allegations because Magruder had occupied a senior campaign position. His cooperation showed that the cover-up was beginning to collapse from within and threatened to bring the campaign’s leadership into the criminal case.
April 17, 1973
Nixon Announces New Inquiries
After meeting with senior Justice Department officials, Nixon announced that he had begun new inquiries into Watergate and that real progress was being made. He promised to suspend government employees indicted in the case and said aides could testify under oath before the Senate committee, subject to possible claims of executive privilege.
The statement marked a reversal from earlier assurances that the investigation had settled the matter. It did not answer why Nixon had delayed or what he had learned, but the change signaled that the crisis had reached the President himself.
April 30, 1973
Haldeman and Ehrlichman Resign
[H. R. Haldeman](entity:character-recall-character-h-r-haldeman-7312416c36e3) and [John Ehrlichman](entity:character-recall-character-john-ehrlichman-93bac5c9969e) resigned, [John Dean](entity:character-recall-character-john-dean-a9754afe5f17) was dismissed, and Attorney General [Richard Kleindienst](entity:character-recall-character-richard-kleindienst-dee90e76920c) also left office. Their departures followed a month of mounting revelations, internal warnings, and cooperation by Magruder and other witnesses.
The resignations acknowledged the scale of the crisis without settling the question of Nixon’s own responsibility. For the Post reporters, the event confirmed that the story had reached the highest levels, but it also marked a transition from uncovering the operation to determining what the President knew and when.
April 30, 1973
Nixon’s Watergate Address
That evening, Nixon addressed the nation and accepted responsibility as the man at the top, while maintaining that he had been misled by those to whom he delegated the campaign. He praised the grand jury, prosecutors, Judge Sirica, and the free press for bringing facts to light.
His insistence that there could be no [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) whitewash clashed with years of dismissals and denials. The speech attempted to contain the damage by presenting the resignations as a break with wrongdoing, even as the investigations continued to reach toward the President.
May 1, 1973
Ziegler Apologizes
[Ron Ziegler](entity:character-recall-character-ron-ziegler-70d25d13123c) publicly apologized to the Washington Post and to Woodward and Bernstein for earlier attacks on their reporting. He conceded that mistakes had been made and that he had been overenthusiastic in denouncing the newspaper.
The apology was a rare acknowledgment that the administration’s public posture had been wrong. It followed months of dismissing the Post’s findings as fiction and underscored how much of the reporters’ work had survived the official counterattack.
May 5, 1973
Dean’s Charges Reach Nixon
[Newsweek](entity:organization-recall-organization-594c821b9582) reported that [John Dean](entity:character-recall-character-john-dean-a9754afe5f17) was prepared to describe episodes suggesting Nixon knew about the cover-up, including an [Oval Office](entity:location-recall-location-f88e742384a9) exchange after the initial indictments and a discussion of executive clemency for Hunt. Woodward confirmed that Dean had told substantially the same account to other sources.
The allegations changed the central question from whether senior aides had concealed Watergate to whether the President himself had participated. The Post proceeded carefully, aware that Dean had not yet made the claims publicly and that their significance depended on independent confirmation.
May 11, 1973
The Ellsberg Case Collapses
Investigators disclosed that [Daniel Ellsberg](entity:character-recall-character-daniel-ellsberg-4e98eac2a65e) had been overheard on a warrantless national-security tap, despite the prosecution’s previous position that no such surveillance was relevant. The government had failed to disclose the information to Ellsberg’s defense.
Judge [Matthew Byrne](entity:character-recall-character-matthew-byrne-99a9eecedf54) dismissed the charges, ruling that government misconduct had incurably infected the prosecution. The case linked Watergate’s covert methods to a broader pattern of surveillance and illegal conduct, and demonstrated how secret operations could destroy the legitimacy of an entire prosecution.
May 14–17, 1973
The Wiretap Logs Surface
William Ruckelshaus announced that seventeen wiretaps had been ordered during the administration’s 1969–71 leak investigations. The missing logs were found in Ehrlichman’s [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) safe, and Woodward learned that [Henry Kissinger](entity:character-recall-character-henry-kissinger-77832ba417c6) had provided some authorizations or names to the FBI.
The revelations showed that surveillance had reached reporters and government officials long before Watergate. They enlarged the scandal into a domestic monitoring program and reinforced the reporters’ concern that national-security language had been used to protect political interests.
Before June 1973
The Brookings Plan
John Caulfield reportedly panicked after [Charles Colson](entity:character-recall-character-charles-colson-c3759ba7ac88) proposed a plan to set a fire at the [Brookings Institution](entity:location-recall-location-72bf2c2498b3) and use the confusion to retrieve classified documents believed to be there. [John Dean](entity:character-recall-character-john-dean-a9754afe5f17) intervened and went to Ehrlichman, who stopped the proposal by confronting Colson.
The plan revealed how far the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) was willing to go to retrieve information and how close its covert work came to an operation involving arson. Colson initially called the story absurd, then conceded that a discussion about recovering highly classified documents had occurred.
March 1972; disclosed in 1973
Hunt’s Mission to Denver
Colson sent [E. Howard Hunt](entity:character-recall-character-e-howard-hunt-659940e3b281) to [Denver](entity:location-recall-location-0fb3748a48a3) to visit [Dita Beard](entity:character-recall-character-dita-beard-7ec78165f05a) during the controversy over an ITT memorandum. Hunt used an alias and wore a cheap reddish wig; the apparent purpose was to help establish that the memorandum implicating ITT and the administration was forged.
The Post’s reporting connected Colson, Hunt, and a private investigative channel to the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd)’s response to the scandal. The mission showed that Hunt’s work extended well beyond the Watergate burglary and that the administration used intermediaries to manage politically dangerous information.
Spring 1972
The Haiphong Opinion Campaign
CRP officials described a campaign to manufacture public support for Nixon’s decision to mine Haiphong Harbor. The committee paid for a newspaper advertisement and organized phony telegrams, calls, and other expressions of approval that could be presented as spontaneous public opinion.
James Dooley later said campaign workers also rigged a local television poll by mailing thousands of falsified ballots. The scheme showed that the campaign’s covert tactics extended beyond spying on opponents to manipulating public sentiment through fabricated evidence of popular support.
May 17, 1973
The Senate Hearings Open
The Senate Watergate hearings began in public, bringing the investigation into American homes through televised testimony. The hearings gave the public a forum independent of the executive branch and placed the administration’s claims under sustained questioning.
For Woodward and Bernstein, the hearings also changed the reporting environment: testimony and committee disclosures could confirm or challenge months of anonymous-source reporting. The story’s center of gravity shifted toward sworn accounts and the evidence that officials had tried to conceal.
September 1971; exposed in April 1973
The Ellsberg Psychiatrist Burglary
Hunt and Liddy had supervised a burglary at the office of [Daniel Ellsberg](entity:character-recall-character-daniel-ellsberg-4e98eac2a65e)’s psychiatrist in California, seeking material that could discredit the Pentagon Papers leaker. Judge Byrne learned of the operation during Ellsberg’s trial and disclosed that Watergate prosecutors had informed him about it.
The burglary linked the Watergate team to an earlier effort to obtain private information through illegal entry. It strengthened the argument that the administration’s covert work had developed over time and was not limited to the 1972 campaign.
May 15, 1972; disclosed in June 1973
The Bremer Apartment Plan
After Arthur Bremer shot Governor George Wallace, Hunt said Colson wanted him to go to [Milwaukee](entity:location-recall-location-ebdeada54aa1) and break into Bremer’s apartment for material that might connect the assassin to left-wing politics. Reporters had already learned that the apartment was accessible to journalists before the FBI secured it.
Colson denied ordering a burglary, then acknowledged that prosecutors had asked him about discussion of retrieving classified material and said the plan had never been carried out. The allegation showed how quickly the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) sought political advantage from a national tragedy.
1972–1973; exposed in spring 1973
The Hunt Blackmail Scheme
Sources told the reporters that Hunt used the Watergate arrests to demand money from the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd), eventually turning the conspirators’ silence into an extortion scheme. Dean’s associates described rising estimates for the cost of keeping the operation contained, while officials struggled to raise and distribute the cash.
The alleged blackmail helped explain why money continued moving after the arrests and why the cover-up became increasingly dangerous. The President and his aides feared that the burglars might reveal the larger covert program if their needs were not met.
March–April 1973
Dean’s March 21 Account
[John Dean](entity:character-recall-character-john-dean-a9754afe5f17)’s associates said that he had told Nixon the cover-up involved a long list of officials and that senior aides had kept the President isolated from the truth. Dean believed that Haldeman and Ehrlichman had directed him and that they were now trying to make him the scapegoat.
The Post reported that Dean was preparing to cooperate and that the struggle inside the administration had become a contest over who would take responsibility. His account offered a possible route from the campaign cover-up toward Nixon himself, but the reporters still needed corroboration and documentary support.
December 1972; disclosed in April 1973
Colson’s Warning to Nixon
Two associates said that [Charles Colson](entity:character-recall-character-charles-colson-c3759ba7ac88) had warned Nixon as early as December that people around him were deeply involved in Watergate and its cover-up. Colson denied warning the President, saying he would not discuss private conversations with Nixon.
Additional sources supported the account, suggesting that Nixon had been alerted while he continued to protect the officials under suspicion. The dispute made the President’s knowledge of the cover-up harder to separate from the choices he made after receiving warnings.
June–December 1972; revealed April 1973
Gray Destroys Hunt’s Files
According to [Deep Throat](entity:character-recall-character-deep-throat-ef6f99bc6aea) and Dean’s associates, [John Dean](entity:character-recall-character-john-dean-a9754afe5f17) and Ehrlichman told [L. Patrick Gray](entity:character-recall-character-l-patrick-gray-df1f9614b9fc) that files taken from Hunt’s safe were political dynamite and should never become public. Gray kept the materials for a time and later said he burned them, though he disputed exactly when and how the destruction occurred.
The files reportedly included fabricated cables concerning President Kennedy and a dossier on Edward Kennedy. Their destruction implicated the FBI’s acting director in the cover-up and showed that officials were trying to prevent politically explosive evidence from reaching investigators.
May–June 1973
The President’s Role Becomes a Question
Justice Department lawyers debated whether an incumbent President could be indicted or called before a grand jury. They concluded that constitutional limits might prevent prosecution while Nixon remained in office, even if evidence raised questions about obstruction.
The Post reported that prosecutors believed questioning Nixon could be justified, provoking a furious [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) response and demands to identify the sources. The dispute exposed a constitutional barrier that complicated the investigation without resolving whether the President had participated in the cover-up.
April 1973
McCord’s Payoff Testimony
McCord told the Senate committee that money from the Nixon campaign had been used to pay the Watergate conspirators. The account tied the secret campaign fund to efforts to buy silence after the arrests and gave investigators a route into the cover-up’s financial machinery.
Sloan’s earlier account of cash passing from the fund to LaRue now seemed newly important. The central financial trail had come full circle, connecting the campaign’s original espionage funds to its later attempt to contain the scandal.
April 30, 1973
The White House Upheaval
Nixon accepted the resignations of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, dismissed Dean, and replaced Kleindienst with [Elliot Richardson](entity:character-recall-character-elliot-richardson-9694eee51858). The reshuffle followed mounting evidence, the prospect of indictments, and the collapse of trust among officials who had once presented a unified front.
The departures did not end the investigation or settle the question of presidential knowledge. They instead left a smaller circle around Nixon and made former aides more likely to disclose what they knew to protect themselves.
July 13–16, 1973
The Taping System Revealed
During a Senate committee interview, [Alexander Butterfield](entity:character-recall-character-alexander-butterfie-c7b125e2e636) revealed that Nixon had secretly recorded conversations in the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd). The system’s existence had been known to only a small circle, and even many senior officials had not known that the President’s conversations were being taped.
The tapes promised direct evidence where testimony had been disputed, but they also created an immediate constitutional and legal confrontation over access. What had once been a hidden method of preserving presidential conversations became the most consequential evidence in the investigation.
October 20, 1973
The Saturday Night Massacre
After special prosecutor [Archibald Cox](entity:character-recall-character-archibald-cox-80a16f7ddc4c) demanded presidential tapes, Nixon ordered him dismissed. Richardson and Ruckelshaus resigned rather than carry out the order, and Robert Bork ultimately removed Cox.
The confrontation ignited public outrage and deepened the constitutional crisis. Nixon later yielded some recordings under court pressure, but the mass departure of senior Justice Department officials made the administration’s resistance look like an effort to obstruct the investigation.
November 21, 1973
The Eighteen-Minute Gap
The [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) disclosed that one of Nixon’s subpoenaed recordings contained an eighteen-and-a-half-minute gap. Earlier, Ziegler had told Bernstein there were no gaps or erasures, relying on the information available to him at the time.
The missing portion intensified suspicion that the tapes had been altered and deprived investigators of a potentially crucial conversation. Nixon’s claim that disclosure would vindicate him became harder to accept when the recordings themselves appeared incomplete.
November 1973
The ‘I Am Not a Crook’ Speech
At a televised meeting with newspaper editors, Nixon declared, “I am not a crook.” He was increasingly isolated in the [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd), distrustful of advisers, and reluctant to let even his own staff hear the full tapes.
The slogan was meant to defend his personal integrity, but it became a symbol of the administration’s effort to answer a crisis of evidence with assertion. The reporters continued to document the widening gap between Nixon’s public claims and the accumulating record.
March 1, 1974
The Watergate Cover-Up Indictments
A federal grand jury indicted seven former [White House](entity:location-recall-location-white-house-91db6c1cd9dd) and campaign officials for conspiracy to obstruct justice, including Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, Mitchell, Strachan, Mardian, and Parkinson. The charges formalized the claim that the cover-up reached well beyond the original burglars.
A second grand jury indicted several figures in the burglary of [Daniel Ellsberg](entity:character-recall-character-daniel-ellsberg-4e98eac2a65e)’s psychiatrist’s office. The overlapping cases confirmed that Watergate was part of a broader pattern of covert operations, illegal entry, and efforts to obstruct investigations.
Early 1974
The Impeachment Inquiry
The [House Judiciary Committee](entity:organization-recall-organization-9e929de4fcaf) began investigating whether Nixon had committed offenses warranting impeachment. The Constitution assigned the House the sole power to impeach, while the Senate would conduct any trial and the Chief Justice would preside.
The inquiry transformed Watergate from a criminal and political scandal into a direct test of presidential accountability. Nixon continued publicly to insist that he would not abandon his office, even as evidence and legal proceedings converged around his presidency.
Early 1974
The Grand-Jury Report to Congress
The Watergate grand jury delivered a report and accompanying evidence concerning Nixon to Judge Sirica, recommending that the material be sent to the [House Judiciary Committee](entity:organization-recall-organization-9e929de4fcaf). Prosecutors had argued that an incumbent President could not be indicted, leaving Congress to consider the evidence.
The transfer placed a substantial investigative record before the body responsible for impeachment. It marked the book’s ending not with a verdict, but with the constitutional process moving forward and the President still insisting that he would remain in office.